Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2010

The State of Utah v. Keith Street : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Richard P. Mauro.
Ryan P. C. Stack.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, The State of Utah v. Keith Street, No. 20100203 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2010).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/2226

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Ca^e No. 20100203

vs.

ORAL AR0UMENT REQUESTED

KEITH STREET,
Defendant-Appellant.
i

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JTI
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION AND SENTENCE
FOR
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-502 (1973 J\S AMENDED)

RICHARD P. MAlURO (5402
43 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utkh 84111
Telephone: (801) ^63-9500
Facsimile: (801) 364-3232
RYAN STACK
Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office
349 South 200 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 535-7767
Facsimile: (801) 535-7640
FILED
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS

AUG 1 7 2010

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAtS

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 20100203
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

vs.
KEITH STREET,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION AND SENTENCE FOR
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR OFFENSE
UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6a-502 (1973 AS AMENDED)

RICHARD P. MAtJRO (5402
43 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Uta|h 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-9500
Facsimile: (801) 364-3232
RYAN STACK
Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office
349 South 200 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 535-7767
Facsimile: (801) 535-7640

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, STANDARD OF
APPELLATE REVIEW, PRESERVATION OF ISSUES AND GROUNDS FOR
APPEAL
1
A.

ISSUE

,

B.

PRESERVATION

C.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1
1

r

1

CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES . . . 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS, DISPOSITION 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.

II.

3

THE POLICE LACKED REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP AND
DETAIN MR. STREET

5

A.

THREE LEVELS OF POLICE/CITIZEN ENCOUNTERS

5

B.

ANALYSIS OF THE TIP IN THIS CASE|

8

1.

THE NATURE OF THE INFORMANT

8

2.

THE TIP LACKED SUFFICIENT FJETAIL

10

3.
THERE WAS NO POLICE CORROBORATION OF TIP 14
THE STOP CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED UNDER THE COMMUNITY
CARETAKER DOCTRINE
17

1

A.

APPLICATION OF THE COMMUNITY CARETAKER
DOCTRINE TO THIS CASE

19

CONCLUSION

21

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

22

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

18

ADDENDUM A

23

ADDENDUM B

25

ADDENDUM C

27

ADDENDUM D

29

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 328 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. pd. 2d 301 (1990)
Garza v. State, 111 S.W.2d 549, 558-59 (Tex.Crim.App.l989J (en banc)

9
13

Grafv. State, Dept. of Commerce and Regulation, 508 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1993)(Henderson,
J, concurring)
15
Commonwealth v. Fraser, 410 Mass. 541, 573 N.E.2d 979, 982 (1991)

13

Ex parte State, 494 So.2d 719, 721 (Ala. 1986)

12

In re Eskiel S., 15 Cal.App. 4th 1638, 19 Cal.Rptr.2d 455, 458 (1993)

12

Kaiser v. State, 296 Ark. 125, 752 S.W.2d 271, 272-73 (1988)

12

Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah App. 1997) ..

7,11,13,15,16

McChesneyv. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Wyo. 1999)

10

Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1992)

17,18,20,21

Salt Lake City v. Bench, 177 P.3d 655, 658 (Utah App. 2008)

2,7,8,10,15,21

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2^055-56, 36 L.Ed.2d 854
(1973)
19
State v. Applegate, 194 P.3d 925, 928 (Utah 2008)
State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276-77 (Utah Ct.App.1994)
State v. Crawford, 2009 WL 1757891 (Wis. App. 2009) ..

6
7, 10,11,12,13,15
19,20

State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987)
State v. Franklin, 841 S.W.2d 639, 644 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) .)

iii

13

State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994)

6

State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655 (Utah App. 1996)

6

State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 (Utah App. 1992)
State v. Roybal, 191 P.3d 822 (Utah App. 2008)

11,16
7, 13

State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)

7

State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)

6

State v. Thompson, 231 Neb. 771,438 N.W.2d 131, 136-37 (1989)
State v. Tibbet, 96 Or. App. 116, 771 P.2d 654 (1989)
State v. Van Dyke, 223 P.3d 465 (Utah App. 2009)
United States v. Alvarado, 430 F.3d 1305 (10th Cir. 2005)

13
9
11,16
6, 7

United States v. Cutchin, 956 F.2d 1216, 1218 (D.C.Cir.1992)

12

United States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 718 (7th Cir.1994)

12

Village ofGumee v. Gross, 174 Ill.App.3d 66, 123 Ill.Dec. 866, 528 N.E.2d 411,412
(1988)
12

Statutes and Rules
United States Constitution Article I

2

United States Constitution Article 14

2

Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-502

2

Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15

2

Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103

1

Utah Constitution

2
iv

Other Authority
LaFave, Search And Seizure: A Treatise On The Fourth Amendment, 2 Search & Seizure

§ 3.4 (4th ed.)

1

v

8

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff, Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

KEITH STREET,

:
Case No. 20|00203

Defendant/Appellant.

:
1

JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e), whereby the defendant in a district court
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals fr6m a final order for anything
other than a first degree or capital felony offense.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE. STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION
Issue: Did the anonymous tip provided to police give tjiem a reasonable articulable
suspicion that Mr. Street was involved in criminal activity to justify the stop of the
vehicle?
Preservation: The issue was preserved in the trial couijt by filing a written motion
to suppress. The trial court also heard testimony at an evidentiary hearing held on June 1,
2009, the parties submitted memoranda addressing the issue, a^id the trial court issued a
memorandum decision on September 28, 2009.
Standard of review: In an appeal from a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress
evidence, this Court reviews the trial court's factual findings f(j>r clear error and its

conclusions of law for correctness. Salt Lake City v. Bench, 177 P.3d 655, 658 (Utah
App. 2008). In search and seizure cases, no deference is granted to the trial court
regarding the application of law to the underlying factual findings. Id,
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The controlling constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are copied in the
addendum to this brief. They include the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution (Addendum "A"), Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution (Addendum "B"),
and Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (Addendum "C"). The trial court's memorandum decision
is attached as Addendum"D."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION
Mr. Street was arrested and later charged with Driving Under the Influence of
Alcohol, a class A misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Arm. § 41-6a-502. Mr. Street
was stopped while driving his vehicle in Liberty Park by Salt Lake City police. Mr. Street
filed a motion to suppress contending that police lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion
to stop his vehicle. He argued that because police violated his constitutional rights, that
all the evidence discovered as a result of the stop should be suppressed.
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the matter on June 9, 2009. The trial
court also considered memoranda filed by both parties and heard legal argument. On
September 28, 2009, the trial court issued a memorandum decision denying Mr. Street's

2

motion to suppress. Thereafter, Mr. Street pled guilty to the |DUI count, and with the trial
court's permission, specifically reserved the right to appeal tjie trial court's denial of the
motion to suppress.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 17, 2008, Salt Lake City Patrol Officer Todd Hyatt "was working a foot
patrol assignment at Liberty Park" in Salt Lake City. Motion Hearing Transcript, 3
(hereinafter "MHT"). He was specifically assigned "to protect and watch" the equipment
and displays at the animal planet exhibit. MHT, 3. There was one other officer on duty
with him that evening. MHT, 3-4. At approximately 9:07 p.m., Hyatt was approached by
a "concerned" female who believed that a male accompanied by a child was intoxicated.
MHT, 3, 4. The female described a vehicle and its general location in the park. MHT, 4
The vehicle was 300 to 500 yards away from the officer when he spoke to the female.
MHT, 5.1 The anonymous female specifically told Hyatt that she was "concerned about a
person that was in a vehicle that had a child in the car with him and was passed out. [The
informant] believed he was intoxicated." MHT, 4. The only other information provided
to the officer was a vehicle description and location in the parte where the vehicle was

1

It is unclear if the anonymous informant first saw the (male and the child walking
in Liberty Park, whether she observed the male and child in th^ car or whether she learned
the information reported to police from a third party.
3

parked. MHT, 4.2
Hyatt went to the location where the vehicle was parked only to discover that it
was in motion, being driven away. Hyatt flagged down the vehicle and made contact with
Mr. Street who was driving. MHT, 6. After the stop, the officer noted an odor of
alcohol, observed bloodshot eyes, and described Mr. Street "acting as if he was
intoxicated." MHT, 6-7. Hyatt called for backup on-duty cars who handled the field
sobriety tests and later arrested Mr. Street for DUI MHT, 6-7.
Officer Hyatt observed no erratic or weaving driving pattern. He stopped the
vehicle because of the information provided by the anonymous informant. MHT, 9-11.
Hyatt obtained no identifying information from the anonymous female informant
such as a name, address, or telephone number. MHT, 10. Moreover, he learned nothing
about when the anonymous informant first observed the driver, how long she observed
the driver, nor how long the driver had been in the park. MHT, 10. Likewise he obtained
no information about "whether [anonymous informant] saw the person drink anything,"
and received no factual information to support the conclusion that the male was
intoxicated. MHT, 12. The officer did not know how close the anonymous informant
was to the male nor how long after making the first observations she spoke to police.
MHT, 11-12. All he could say about the anonymous informant was the "she acted

2

Officer Hyatt does not mention what role, if any, his on duty partner played in
this case.
4

concerned... about the welfare" of the child in the car.
After stopping Mr. Street's vehicle, Hyatt detected thi odor of alcohol, observed
bloodshot eyes, and thought that Mr. Street might be intoxicated. MHT, 6-7. Upon
making those observations, Hyatt contacted "on-duty cars" who arrived to conduct field
sobriety tests. MHT, 7. Mr. Street was later arrested for DU
After hearing argument and considering the parties' memoranda, the trial court
issued a memorandum decision denying the motion to suppress. In its findings of fact,
the trial court found that "a passer-by in the park-a woman with children in towapproached [officer Hyatt] and informed him that there was aj man passed out behind the
wheel of a parked car3 and that she thought the man was intoxicated." The trial court
noted that the informant told police about the child in the car. The trial court found that
the woman provided no identifying information. She merely described the car's location
300 to 500 yards away. The court found that officer Hyatt "stppped the car . . . and did
not observe any driving irregularities prior to the stop."

I. THE POLICE LACKED REASONABLE SUSPICION TO
STOP AND DETAIN MR. STREET

A. Three Levels of Police/Citizen Encounters

Hyatt never testified he was told that the man was passed out "behind the wheel
of a parked car," but instead testified that "a person . . . was in a vehicle that had a child
in the car with him and was passed out." MHT, 4.
5

Utah courts have identified three levels defining police/citizen encounters. State v.
Deitman, 739 P.2d 616 (Utah 1987). In a level I encounter police may approach a citizen
and pose questions "so long as the person is not detained against his will." Id. at 617-18.
The second level, which applies to this case, allows police to "seize a person if the officer
has an "articulable suspicion" that the person has committed or is about to commit a crime
. .. ."4 The third level allows police to arrest a suspect "if the officer has probable cause
to believe an offense has been committed or is being committed." Id.
The most common type of level II encounter stop is when police personally
observe conduct in violation of law. State v. Applegate, 194 P.3d 925, 928 (Utah 2008)
quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994)("a routine traffic stop is
justified at the inception "if the stop is incident to a traffic violation committed in the
officers' presence.") Examples of traffic violations include failing to signal, e.g., State v.
Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), equipment violations, State v. Patefield,
927 P.2d 655 (Utah App. 1996), and observations of erratic driving. See United States v.
Alvarado, 430 F.3d 1305 (10th Cir. 2005). In those circumstances, police may stop the
vehicle, obtain identifying and other information from the person, and either issue a

4

This level of encounter is generally known as a Terry stop and is codified by
Utah Code Ann. §77-7-15:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand his name, address and an
explanation of his actions.
6

citation or detain the person further if there is suspicion of niore serious criminal activity.
See State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). To justify a traffic stop, the
officer "'must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion."' State v. Roybal,
191 P.3d 822 (Utah App. 2008) rev 'don other grounds 232 P.3d 1016 (Utah 2010).
In some instances, police may base stop decisions on information from third
parties. See State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 1276-77 (Utah Ct App. 1994) ("The specific
and articulable facts required to support reasonable suspicion are most frequently based
on an investigating officer's own observations and inferences but under certain
circumstances the officer may rely on other sources of information[,]" including
"bulletins, or flyers received from other law enforcement sources."): Kaysville City v.
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231 (Utah App. 1997) (articulating standards for determining when
third party tips can support reasonable suspicion stops) see also Salt Lake City v. Bench,
177 P.3d at 661. In deciding whether a third party tip is reliaple and supported by
reasonable suspicion, Utah courts apply a three-part test. The first prong looks at the type
of tip involved. Bench, 177 P.3d at 661; Mulchahy, 943 P.2d at 235. When police rely

r

on an anonymous tip, the basis of knowledge and veracity are unknown, and thus
anonymous tips are toward the low end of the reliability scale. Mulcahy, at 235. The
second prong considers whether the informant provided sufficient detail to police to
support the stop. As part of that analysis, the courts look to see if the informant observed

7

details herself or relayed information from a third party. Id. The third prong looks to
whether the police officer's personal observations confirm the dispatcher's report of the
informant's tip. Id. In cases where the information provided to police is scant, more
police corroboration is required. Bench, 111 P.3d at 662.
B. Analysis of The Tip in This Case
L The Nature of the Informant
Known, identified citizen informants, unlike police informants, are generally
considered reliable. See generally LaFave, Search And Seizure: A Treatise On The
Fourth Amendment, 2 Search & Seizure § 3.4 (4th ed.). That is because a citizen who is a
witness or victim usually provides information out of concern for society without
expectation of benefit:
an ordinary citizen who reports a crime which has been committed in
his presence, or that a crime is being or will be committed, stands on
much different ground than a police informer. He is a witness to
criminal activity who acts with an intent to aid the police in law
enforcement because of his concern for society or for his own safety.
He does not expect any gain or concession in exchange for his
information. An informer of this type usually would not have more
than one opportunity to supply information to the police, thereby
precluding proof of his reliability by pointing to previous accurate
information which he has supplied.
LaFave, supra, at §3.4(a).
The trial court here equated the tip by the unidentified informant with that of an
identified, reliable citizen informant. Memorandum Decision, at 3. The Court reasoned
that a face-to-face encounter with police put her "anonymity at risk" "subjecting herself

8

to potential criminal and civil penalties for a false report." JThe court thus concluded that
the information provided by the informant was "highly reliable/' because the court
assumed that the anonymous witness was simply a disinterested witness.
Identity, however, is the lynchpin of reliability, not the possibility that the
informant might eventually be identified. Alabama v. White , 496 U.S. 325, 328 110 S.
Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990). (An informant's "veracity," "reliability," and "basis
of knowledge" are "relevant in determining the value of his report."). In this case, the
informant always remained anonymous as the police never obtained her name, address,
telephone number or other identifying information. Compare State v. Tibbet, 96 Or.
App. 116, 771 P.2d 654 (1989) (A face-to-face informant who does not provide name,
address, telephone number or identifying information "is just as anonymous" as an
unidentified telephone informant).5 While a face-to-face encounter may sometimes
place one's "anonymity at risk," the anonymity still does not provide a basis to
subsequently evaluate the reliability of the information. In other words, "the basis of
knowledge and veracity" are still unknown, because the informant has remained
anonymous.
Moreover, there is no explanation by the officer why Ije did not simply ask for the

5

Ironically, with the state of technological telephonic advances, police are more
likely to identify an anonymous telephone caller, than an unidentified street person. Once
the street walker leaves there is no technology that will allow police to identify that
person.
9

person's identifying information or have his partner obtain that information. Once the
informant left the area, police had no way of confirming her information.6

2. The Tip Lacked Sufficient Detail
The detail provided to Officer Hyatt was scant. State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274,
1278 (Utah App. 1994)("Merely providing descriptive information to an officer about
whom to stop, by itself, is not enough to justify the stop if there are no articulable facts
pointed to which establish why a stop was to be made.").7 There is no information
6

The Wyoming Supreme Court noted potential problems associated with
information provided by an anonymous informant:
An anonymous tip, without more, may be no more than a citizenfs
hunch or merely an assertion based on rumor. In addition, the
potential for citizen abuse is readily apparent. Anybody with enough
knowledge about a given person to make that person the target of a
prank, or to harbor a grudge against the person, will certainly be able
to formulate [such a] tip.
McChesneyv. State, 988 P.2d 1071, 1077 (Wyo. 1999)
7

Simply finding a vehicle in the area described by an anonymous tipster is not
corroboration unless the tipster provides detailed facts and other specific identifying
information. Compare Bench, at 663 ("seeing a person who matches the description of a
suspect cannot become corroboration for the suspected offense that is so lacking in
reasonable articulable suspicion [because] [sjuch boot strapping simply does not work,
for the reason that whom police are looking for has nothing to do with why the suspect is
sought.") quoting State v.Case, 884 P:2d 1274, 1279 n.l l(emphasis in original) with
Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 236 (court finds sufficient corroboration when caller provided
specific details, personally observed the details, and described details to police as the
events unfolded); State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 (Utah App. 1992)(police given description
10

describing how the anonymous informant concluded Mr. Street was intoxicated, how
long she observed the male, or how far away she was when making the observations.
She apparently did not observed the male drinking alcohol and provided no other
observations for her conclusion that the male was intoxicated.8 She instead expressed a
conclusion of concern because the male was accompanied by a child, but articulates no
factual basis to support her conclusion of concern.
The tipster provided three facts to police: (1) a male ^as accompanied by a child;9
(2) the male was "passed out;" and (3) the tipster believed the male was intoxicated.
Although the trial court added an additional fact, that the male was behind the wheel of
an automobile, the officer never said he was told of that fact.|10 The officer eventually

of alleged drunk driver in described car and license plate and j;hen observed car in
described location driving in erratic manner was sufficient corroboration to support stop).
8

She apparently told officer Hyatt that the male was "passed out" in the vehicle.
Again, there is no indication in the record what she meant by ypassed out," whether she
made the observation personally or was told by a third party, or where she or someone
else was in relation to making that observation. Police apparently asked no follow-up
questions to clarify the tipster's statements.
9

There is no indication where this observation was made, e.g., did she observe
the male and child, were they inside the car or walking througn the park, why was the
male's conduct suspicious? Compare State v. Van Dyke, 223 P.3d 465 (Utah App. 2009)
(stop of suspected intoxicated person who was earlier observed in park upheld when
people reporting incident had face to face encounter with defendant, smelled the odor of
alcohol, and described odd behavior consistent with intoxication).
10

The additional court-added fact that the person was "behind the wheel of an
automobile" does not change the analysis because it does not describe additional facts that
would suggest intoxication. In other words, that fact does not elevate the value of the tip
because it lacks specific identifying information that supports ^n articulable suspicion of
11

found the male behind the wheel when he made the stop, but it is unknown how long he
was in that position in the car. The analysis outlined by this Court in State v. Case and
the cases cited therein, support the conclusion that the tip here did not provide an
adequate basis to justify the stop:
Finally, we note that our conclusion [suppressing the evidence] is
fully consistent with a number of cases from other jurisdictions
holding, as we do here, that if an investigating officer relies solely on
transmitted information from other sources, no legally sufficient
reasonable suspicion exists in the absence of a demonstrated factual
basis for the issuing department's information. See, e.g., United
States v. Ornelas-Ledesma, 16 F.3d 714, 718 (7th Cir.1994)
(uncorroborated tip by itself does not justify stop, even if tip comes
from law enforcement sources); United States v. Cutchin, 956 F.2d
1216, 1218 (D.C.Cir.1992) (evidence contained on 911 tapes goes
directly to issue of whether dispatch had requisite reasonable
suspicion); Ex parte State, 494 So.2d 719, 721 (Ala.1986) (radio
dispatch describing vehicle involved in drug sale not sufficient to
justify stop absent evidence of circumstances giving rise to
dispatch); Kaiser v. State, 296 Ark. 125, 752 S.W.2d 271, 272-73
(1988) (no evidence in record to support reasonable suspicion for
directive, broadcast by Missouri police to Arkansas police, to stop
vehicle carrying drugs); In re Eskiel S., 15 Cal.App. 4th 1638, 19
Cal.Rptr.2d 455, 458 (1993) (record devoid of evidence showing
officer who originated report had reasonable suspicion); Village of
Gurnee v. Gross, 11A IU.App.3d 66, 123 Ill.Dec. 866, 528 N.E.2d
411,412 (1988) (no evidence presented that related to source or
factual basis of reckless driving complaint broadcast to investigating
officer); Commonwealth v. Fraser, 410 Mass. 541, 573 N.E.2d 979,
982 (1991) (no evidence indicating reasonable suspicion for officer
making radio call describing armed person in vehicle); State v.
Franklin, 841 S.W.2d 639, 644 (Mo. 1992) (en banc) (no evidence in
record establishing basis of dispatch concerning armed individual in
certain vehicle); State v. Thompson, 231 Neb. 771, 438 N.W.2d 131,

intoxication.
12

136-37 (1989) (no evidence in dispatch tape that proved factual
foundation for a broadcast concerning a "suspicious" vehicle in a
certain area); Garza v. State, 111 S.W.2d 549, 558-59
(Tex.Crim.App.1989) (en banc) (officer who passed information that
defendant was "good for" burglaries in investigating officer's area
had no articulable facts to support statement).
Case, 884 P.2d at 1279-80.
It is also unclear whether the anonymous informant actually observed the male
with the child or whether that information was conveyed to tne tipster by a third person
Mulchay, 9A3 P.2d at 236 (UA tip is more reliable if it is apparent that the informant
observed the details personally, instead of simply relaying in brmation from a third
party.") Indeed, there is no information about where the tipsier was when she observed
the male, how long she observed the male, or how she concluded that the male might be
intoxicated. See RoybaU 191 P.3d at 826 rev'don other grounds 232 P.3d 1016 (Utah
2010) ("the statement that a person has been drinking, by itself-with no other facts
regarding the amount of alcohol consumed, the type of beverage consumed, or the period
of time over which the person consumed the alcohol, or the person's physical size-does
not provide an adequate basis on which to rationally infer thai the person has an alcohol
level beyond the legally proscribed limit..., or that the person consumed alcohol to the
extent that he or she could not safely drive a vehicle").11 In f^ct, it is plausible that the

11

Here, the only statement made by the anonymous informant was that "[s]he
believed [that the male] was intoxicated." MHT, 4. There is no factual description of
why she believed him to be drunk such as observations of behavior or description of
physical symptoms and no information about quantity of alcohol, type of alcohol, or time
period over which alcohol was consumed.
13

anonymous female informant was as far away as 300 to 500 yards when she observed the
male with the child, given the testimony of Officer Hyatt who was that distance from the
car when contacted by the informant.
There is likewise no description of how she concluded that a "passed out" person
was intoxicated as opposed to napping or simply sitting in the car with one's eyes closed.
One justice on the South Dakota Supreme Court described the problems with such vague,
conclusory tips:
"A possible under the influence driver" is a conclusion and is not
factually oriented. If we embark upon arrests and seizures, based upon
anonymous tips of "a possible under the influence driver," without
factual support of a misdeed violation, every citizen is subject to
immediate stop—at the whim of any officer. We would become a
police state, no different than many foreign countries. Our Constitution
must not become illusory or rendered meaningless. The Fourth
Amendment commands: "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures ..." This provision of our Constitution brought into existence
public acknowledgment of a free society regarding persons, houses,
papers, and effects, (footnote omitted) In effect, four freedoms, all
contained within the Fourth Amendment. If language in that
amendment of freedom is to mirror reality, an amendment paid for
with the blood of our forefathers, let us instill integrity within its spirit
and not make it fragile.
Grafv. State, Dept. of Commerce and Regulation, 508 N.W.2d 1 (S.D. 1993)(Henderson,
J, concurring)
3. There was No Police Corroboration of Tip
Finally, there was no corroboration of reckless or erratic driving, or any observed
confirmation of intoxication prior to the stop. See Bench, 111 P.3d at 662-63 (finding a
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person or vehicle in an area described by the tipster is not corroboration when the tip
itself lacks sufficient details); Case, 884 P.2d at 1279 (stopping an individual in an area,
who appeared to match physical description conveyed by tipster "is not corroboration of
criminal activity, only of physical characteristics that by therpselves have no relevance to
criminal activity.").
In Mulcahy, this Court found there to be sufficient police corroboration of the
informant's information, when the informant had a face to face encounter with the
defendant, personally observed symptoms consistent with intoxication, and stayed on the
telephone with the dispatcher describing the movements of the defendant until police
made the stop. The significant detail provided by the caller, in real time, justified the
police stop, even though police did not directly observe an adverse driving pattern.
Similarly, in Roth, this Court found adequate corroboration of an alleged drunk driver
when police received a report of a possible intoxicated person in a hospital emergency
room. Police were given information about the make, model and license plate of the car.
Of significant importance to the corroboration determination, this Court observed the
described vehicle in the reported location, and observed that jhe defendant "was having a
hard time driving" and was driving "slow and jerky," information which corroborated the
reported intoxicated driver. Roth, at 256.
In this case, the tipster's information was neither detailed nor sufficiently
descriptive to support a reasonable suspicion that Mr. Street was intoxicated. In fact,
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there is no direct evidence that the tipster personally observed Mr. Street and may have
been reporting information received from a third party. Compare Mulcahy, at 237
(sufficient detail was provided when an informant reported personally observing "a drunk
individual" leaving the informant's residence "in a white ear-possibly a Toyota-heading
out of his subdivision toward the main road."); Van Dyke, 223 P.3d at 472 (face-to-face
encounter where identified tipster smelled alcohol on defendant and observed conduct
consistent with intoxication was sufficient to justify police traffic stop of defendant).
Here, there was no real time observation or detailed factual description that would support
a conclusion that the male was intoxicated. Instead, the tipster merely reports a possible
intoxicated person, without any explanation of conduct to justify that conclusion.
Finally, police observed no traffic violations that would justify the stop, but instead
flagged down Mr. Street's vehicle based solely on the tipster's report. See Roth, at 256.
These facts are consistent with a classic uncorroborated anonymous tip case. The
tipster is anonymous and accordingly the information provided by her is on the low end of
the reliability scale. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234. The information is so lacking in factual
detail it is difficult to determine how any crime was being committed. The information
conveyed is more akin to a subjective conclusion or citizen hunch based on the tipster's
unarticulated "concern." And finally, the police do not independently corroborate any
evidence of intoxication based on the factual detail provided by the tipster, the driving
pattern, or appearance of Mr. Street prior to the stop. Under these circumstances, the
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court should reverse the trial court's denial of the motion to [suppress and remand the case
for proceedings consistent with that order.
II. THE STOP CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED UNDER THlt COMMUNITY
CARETAKER DOCTRINE

At the motion to suppress hearing, the City, argued tliat the stop, although based on
anonymous information, could alternatively be supported as a police "welfare check."
The trial court did not address this issue in its memorandum decision. See Memorandum
Decision, at 1 ("Because I find reasonable suspicion, I need not and do not, reach the
question of the applicability of the community caretaker exception."). Mr. Street
contends that if the City chooses to address this issue on appeal, the community caretaker
exception does not apply in this case. Mr. Street accordingly addresses the issue below.
Although Utah courts neither recognize nor sanction police welfare checks, this
Court does recognize a doctrine known as the community caretaker doctrine. Provo City
v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1992). Police stops based on a community caretaker
rationale are outside the traditional penal and regulatory framework and are therefore
governed by special rules set forth by Utah Court of Appeals Id. Those rules keep intact
Fourth Amendment protections to " an individual's right to be free from arbitrary
interferences from law enforcement officers . . . . " Id. at 363 As such this Court adopted
the following three-part test in determining the legality of community caretaker stops
1. Has a seizure within the meaning of fourth amendment occurred?
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2. Based on an objective analysis, was the seizure in pursuit of a
bona fide community caretaker function-under the given
circumstances, would a reasonable officer have stopped a vehicle for
a purpose consistent with community caretaker functions? and
3. Based on an objective analysis, did the circumstances
demonstrate an imminent danger to life or limb?

Warden, 844 P.2d at 364
This Court adopted the community caretaker doctrine guardedly, noting that use of
the doctrine to circumvent the Fourth Amendment is not appropriate. Id. at 364-365 ("In
adopting this test, we expressly disavow the reasoning in those cases which have upheld
motorist stops when an insignificant article of the driver's personal property was
endangered or when a motorist appeared to be lost in less than life-threatening
circumstances. While these instances may represent legitimate community interests, they
are entitled to slight weight as compared to the protection of the Fourth Amendment.").
"Instead, we adopt the requirement of imminent danger to life or limb as a component of
the reasonableness test because of the Fourth Amendment's guarantee of 'the right of the
people to be secure' against arbitrary invasions by the government." Id. (emphasis added)
quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 242, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2055-56, 36
L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). This Court also noted that legitimate exercises of police community
caretaker responsibilities might nonetheless still be unreasonable under the fourth
amendment and "may result in application of the exclusionary rule." Id. (Application of
the exclusionary rule in some community caretaker cases "appears to be a legitimate
18

means of encouraging genuine police caretaker functions wfyile deterring bogus or
pretextual police activities.").
A. Application of the Community Caretaker Doctrine to This Case
In this case, Mr. Street was seized for the purposes or the Fourth Amendment.
Therefore, the test requires analysis of the remaining two prongs. In considering the
second prong - was the seizure in pursuit of a bona fide conjmunity caretaker function there is scant evidence in the record to suggest that the officer's stop was for a community
caretaker function.12 Instead, the purpose for the stop here w^s consistent with the
traditional "penal and regulatory framework" (to determine if the driver was violating
Utah's DUI laws) as opposed to a safety or welfare check to determine if there was
"imminent danger to life or limb." Warden, 844 P.2d at 364 see State v. Crawford, 2009
WL 1757891 (Wis. App. 2009)(although defendant was injured in traffic accident, court
rejected community caretaker justification when it found chief reason for stopping
defendant was to investigate criminal conduct).13 In fact, thq first thing that the officer
12

In Warden, the court of appeals found there to be a I legitimate community
caretaker purpose for the stop because Warden had threatened suicide. Warden, at 365
("prevention of suicide is consistent with an officer's community caretaker function.")
13

The Utah Court of Appeals adopted much of the justification for the community
caretaker doctrine from Wisconsin appellate court decisions. Warden, at 364 ("[w]e ...
adopt a three tier test- modeled in part on Wisconsin's Anderson test - to determine if a
stop is reasonable
") In Crawford, which applied the Anderson test, the defendant
fled the scene of an auto accident in which he was injured. Police followed him, ordered
him to stop, and arrested him. The state argued that police were justified in stopping and
detaining him based on the community caretaker doctrine. Although the court suggests a
possible independent ground to arrest Crawford the state nev^r argued anything but the
19

did upon making stop was to call "for some on-duty cars that were not assigned to the
park that could come and go ahead and do FST's and handle the DUI." MHT, 7. He
articulated no bases for believing that any occupant's safety was in jeopardy. Instead, the
record clearly indicates that the stop was made to investigate a possible DUI, not to
determine if one of the occupants faced imminent danger to life or limb.
As noted above, there was no articulated danger to life or limb that would justify a
stop under the community caretaker doctrine. The informant provides no articulable basis
to conclude there is imminent danger to life or limb. She merely told police that she was
concerned about a person in the park, that the person was "passed out," and she believed
the person was intoxicated. When this information was communicated to police, both the
anonymous informant and Officer Hyatt were 300 to 500 yards away from the vehicle.
Moreover, there is no exigency to justify the stop. In Warden, unlike here, the defendant
told two people that he wanted to purchase cocaine to kill himself. That exigency was
immediate and of legitimate concern to police who understandably tried to prevent an
imminent suicide. In this case, however, it is unknown when the anonymous informant or
someone else observed alleged symptoms of intoxication, how long the male remained in
the car before driving off, or whether the passage of time was sufficient to dissipate any
alleged symptoms of intoxication. There simply was no articulated exigency that would

community caretaker doctrine. The court rejected the state's argument finding that the
police conduct was more in line with apprehending a suspect for a crime than for concern
with the defendant's well-being.
20

justify the stop on community caretaker grounds. Moreoverj, alleged observations of
possible intoxication alone, do not rise to the level of seriouk danger that justify a
community caretaker stop. See Bench, at 663 (Court fails to adopt City's argument that
potential drunk drivers pose such a serious risk to general public to support loosened
standard of reasonable suspicion).

CONCLUSION
Mr. Street asks this Court to reverse the decision of the trial court denying the
motion to suppress. He contends that police lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to
justify the stop because the informant was anonymous, the tip lacked specific details and
there was no corroboration by police. Additionally, there was no exigency, emergency, or
imminent threat to life or limb that would justify a stop on community caretaker grounds.
Dated this J _ / _ d k y of August, 2010.

VU&•L

RICHARD P. MA^JRO
Attorney for Keith Street
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certifytfLata true and correct copy of the foregoing was delivered via U.S. Mail
on August I/T^OIO to:
Ryan Stack
Salt Lake City Prosecutor's Office
349 South 200 East, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM "A

Amendment IV. Search and seizure
The right of the people to be secure in their perkons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place (to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

ADDENDUM "B

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons houses, papers arp
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and nj|
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation?!
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to bgf
seized.

ADDENDUM *C"

§ 77-7-15.
Grounds

Authority of peace officer to stop andl question suspect—

A peace officer may stop any person in a public place when he has a
reasonable suspicion to believe he has committed or is in the act of committing
or is attempting to commit a public offense and may demanjd his name, address
and an explanation of his actions.
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2.

ADDENDUM "D"
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Deputy Clerk

SALT LAKE CITY
MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff
v.
|Civil No. 085900348
KEITH T. STREET,
Jijdge: Deno G. Himonas
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION

TJl
Based on information provided by a citizen-informaht, Officer Todd Hyatt conducted
a traffic stop on a vehicle being operated by the defendant, Keith Street. Street contends Officer
Hyatt lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify stopping h(im. Therefore, Street has moved
to suppress all evidence emanating from the stop.
^|2
The prosecuting authority, Salt Lake City, counters that Officer Hyatt did possess
reasonable, articulable suspicion supporting his stop. The City cllso argues that the officer acted
appropriately under the community caretaker doctrine.
1|3
Having heard the evidence and arguments of cotmsel, and having reviewed the
parties' memoranda, I find that Officer Hyatt did have reasonable suspicion for the stop.' Therefore,
1 deny Street's Motion to Suppress.
BACKGROUND
1|4
The list of facts at play in this matter is short. On July 17, 2008, Officer Hyatt was
on fool patrol in Liberty Park. His specific assignment was to watch and protect the equipment and
displays associated with the Animal Planet exhibit being staged at the park. Shortly after 9:00 p.m.,
a passer-by in the park-a woman with children in tow-approached him and informed him that there
was a man passed out behind the wheel of a parked car and that shelthought the man was intoxicated.
She also told him there was a child in the car.

'Because 1 find reasonable suspicion, J need not, and do not, r^ach the question of the
applicability of the community caretaker exception.

1(5
After obtaining a description of the car and man from the woman, Officer Hyatt went
off to investigate the matter. He did not obtain any additional information from the woman (e.g., her
name and contact information) before doing so.2
^|6
Officer Hyatt located the car approximately where the woman described it would be;3
however, the car was in motion. The officer stopped the car. He did not observe any driving
irregularities prior to the stop.
ANALYSIS

^|7
Our appellate courts have consistently held "that a police officer's stop is a 'seizure'
and therefore subject to Fourth Amendment protections." State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255, 257 (Utah
App. 1992) (citations omitted); sec also Salt Lake City v Bench, 2008 UT App 30, P 7, 177 P.3d
655; Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah App. 1997). 'Thus, a stop can be justified
only upon a showing of reasonable suspicion that [the] defendant had committed or was committing
a crime or that he was stopped incident to a traffic offense." Roth, 827 P.2d at 257 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
^|8
"In order to satisfy the reasonable suspicion inquiry," within the context of the case
sub judice the City must demonstrate "from the facts apparent to the officer and the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom, that [the] officer would reasonably suspect that defendant was driving"
under the influence. Roth, 827 P.2d at 257 (citations omitted). "This suspicion must be based upon
articulated objective facts then apparent to the officer." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). "Whether there are objective facts to justify such a stop depends on the totality of the
circumstances." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
1(9
While "' [t]he articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion are usually grounded
in an officer's personal perceptions and inferences, . . . in some cases the officer may rely upon
externa] information-e.g., an informant's tip via police dispatch' in concluding there is a legal basis
for a stop." Sail Lake City v. Bench, 2008 UT App 30, P 8, 177 P.3d 655 (quoting Mulcahy, 943
P.2d at 234) (emphasis added). "If an officer does rely on such external information to justify
stopping a suspect, but cannot provide independent or corroborating information through his or her
own observations, the legality of that stop will ultimately depend on the sufficiency of the articulable
facts known to the individual originating the information or bulletin subsequently received and acted
upon by the investigating officer." Bench, 2008 UT App at P 8 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted) (emphasis in original removed).

2

The woman's statement that there was a child in the car explains Officer Hyatt's decision to act
with dispatch.
3

Officer Hyatt located the car some 300-500 yards away from where he was approached.
2

^|] 0
Here, Officer Hyatt did not observe a driving pattern or any other conduct that would
tend to suggest thai Street was operating his vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.
Consequently, the question becomes whether the report by the citizen-informant "provided a
sufficient basis on which to justify the stop." Bench, 2008 UT App at P 14. "To establish adequate
articulable suspicion," in this context, "the prosecution must show that . . . [the] tip was reliable."
hi, (citing Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 234). 1 consider three factors in making this determination: "(1)
the type of tip or informant involved; (2) whether the reliability of the informant's tip gave .enough
detail about the observed criminal activity to support a stop; and (3) corroboration of the information
by law enforcement through a police officer's personal observation^." Id., (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). 1 "address each of these factors in turn." kl.
]\] 1
With respect to the first factor, our courts have concluded that information provided
by "an identified citizen-informant is generally considered 'highly reliable.'"Bench, 2008 UT App
at P 15 (quoting City of St. George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165, 169 (l^tah Ct. App. 1997)). This is
"[bjecause a citizen informant' volunteers] information out of concelrn for the community and not
for personal benefit,' . .. and because 'the informant is exposed to possible criminal and civil
prosecution if the report is false.'" Bench, 2008 UT App atP 15 (quoting Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 235).
There are, however, "circumstances where a citizen-informant's veracity may properly be called into
question." Bench, 2008 UT App at P 15 (report from ex-wife deemed less credible).
1112
Weighing against assigning the highest level of credibility to the tip here is Officer
Hyatt's failure to learn the identity of the citizen-informant. On the other hand, all objective
evidence indicates (and indicated at the time) that the citizen-informant was a passer-by who
happened to observe a man passed out behind the wheel of a car. The objective evidence also
indicates that the citizen-informant approached the officer and provided the information in a face-toface exchange, thereby putting her anonymity at risk and subjecting herself to potential criminal and
civil penalties for a false report. On balance, I conclude that the credibility of the informant is at a
high level.
1113
With respect to the second factor, "[a]n informant's repjort of illegal activity must be
sufficiently detailed to justify a stop." Bench, 2008 UT App at P 17J The decisions of the Utah
Court of Appeals in Bench, 2008 UT App 30, and Mulcahy, 943 P [2d 231, provide significant
guidance on this issue. In Mulcahy, the court held that "sufficient d let ail was provided when an
informant reported personally observing a 'drunk individual' leaving his residence 'in a white
ear-possibly a Toyota-heading out of his subdivision, toward the main J-oad.'" Bench, 2008 UT App
at P 17 (quoting Mulcahy, 943 P.2d at 237). In Bench, by contrast, thel court held that the report by
the defendant's ex-wife that he "had transported the[ir] children in his vehicle while intoxicated,"
and her description of the defendant's vehicle and license plate numbpr was insufficient, standing
alone, to support reasonable suspicion. Bench, 2008 UT App at P 2.
% 14
Of critical importance to the Utah Court of Appeals in Evaluating the "sparse" facts
provided in Mulcahy and Bench was the "reliability of the informant.'!' Bench, 2008 UT App at P
19. The reliability of the citizen-informant here, as noted above, is very high and closer to Mulcahy
3

than Bench Fust, although unnamed, the cilizen-infoimant heie was on foot with childien and
potentially could have been located in the paik and subjected to pioseculion if hei report pioved
bogus Second, there was "no hint of fabrication" 01, conliary to Bench, appaienl motive to
fabricate Mulcahy, 943 P 2 at 236 Rather, the reasonable inference m this case is that a
disinterested citizen-informant personally observed Street passed out behind the wheel of the car
She then reported her observation to Officer Hyatt, along with her belief that the man was drunk
Hei peisonal observation, her description that Stieet was "passed out" behind the wheel, and her
reliability ds an informant places this mallei squarely in the Mulcahy category A
T| 15 With lespect to the thud factor, Officer Hyatt did not observe Street passed out or a
con oboialmg driving pattern He did, however, quickly confirm the citizen-informant's description
of Street, the vehicle, and the vehicle's location This quick veniicalion "supports the mfoimant's
credibility " Mulcahy, 943 P 2d at 238 (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted)
CONCLUSION

H16 In sum, Officer Hyatt was informed by a concerned citizen that a man was drunk and
passed out behind the wheel of a car He was also informed that there was a child m the car Under
these circumstances, the officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that justified the car stop
The Motion to Suppiess is therefore denied
DATED t h i s ^ d a y of September, 2009

BY THE COURT
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The citizen-mfoimant's description of Street being ''passed out" is significant as it conveys
meaningful detail about Street's level of intoxication To this end, I note that "members of the general
public have a common knowledge about whethei a person is under the influence of alcohol " Mulcahy,
943 P 2d a\ 237 (citation omitted)
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